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APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN CIVIL CASES*
Louis J. DEREUIL-t
T HE CONSTITUTION of the United States guarantees to every
person accused of crime the right to a fair and impartial trial
by jury. Under this guarantee, the fourth amendment' to the Con-
stitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures-
and permits them the right to be secure in their homes, papers and
effects from such searches and seizures.
Protection of the basic rights of the individual from both oppres-
sive federal and, since 1961, state3 governmental practices in criminal
proceedings stems from the fourth amendment. The traditional role
played by the fourth amendment in criminal proceedings is un-
questioned.4 Applicability of its protective principle outside the
ambit of the criminal law, however, remains open to inquiry. It is
the purpose of this paper to examine generally the extension of the
role of the fourth amendment to both original and collateral civil
tax proceedings and to measure in particular its effect upon the ad-
missibility of evidence in civil tax proceedings, upon the enforcement
of a section 76021 civil administrative summons, and upon the validity
of certain federal civil tax assessments and forfeiture proceedings. A
*The views expressed are the author's and should not be considered as being
the opinion of the Treasury Department, the Internal Revenue Service, or the Chief
Counsel's Office.
t-B.B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1954, Tulane University; LL.M. 1958, George Washington Uni-
versity; Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Atlanta Region, Internal Revenue Service.
1
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to he seized." U.S. CONsr.
AMEND. IV.
-'Rules 4 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth the require-
ments for the issuance of warrants for arrest and search. A search warrant may be
issued only upon a sworn affidavit showing probable cause and describing the person
or place to be searched, and it can apply only to property stolen, embezzled, or used
or intended for use in the commission of crime.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'VARON, SEARCH, SEIZURES AND IMMUNIIS (1961); Traynor, Mapp. v. Ohio at Large
in the Fifty States, 1962 DUXE LJ. 319; Avakian, Searches and Sei:re, 'N.Y.U. 17-ru
INST. ON FED. TAx 531 (1959).
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
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prior cursory review of the historical role enjoyed by the fourth
amendment in criminal proceedings will assist in placing in proper
perspective the relatively new and expanding course taken by it in
civil proceedings.
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS-BACKGROUND
While unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the
fourth amendment to the Constitution, it should be noted that it
does not expressly bar the admission in criminal proceedings of
evidence obtained unlawfully.8 At common law, the admissibility
of evidence was not affected by the means through which it was
obtained. 7 This rule presently controls the admission of illegally
obtained evidence, except in cases where evidence is secured by
violating the fourth amendment, wire-tapping, or by a coerced con-
fession or by violence or unusually long and illegal detention.9 It is
by judicial interpretation of the scope of the mandate of the fourth
amendment, rather than its specific proscriptions, that such evidence
is excluded from federal criminal proceedings. 10 Exclusion is the
only practical way of enforcing the constitutional protection."
As a matter of historical interest, it may be observed that the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Boyd v. United
States12 early alluded to the possibility that the admission of the
illegally secured evidence was violative of the guarantees contained
in the fourth amendment to the Constitution. The Court there-
after, in Weeks v. United States, 3 adopted the federal exclusionary
rule by which federal courts excluded from consideration any and
all evidence illegally seized by federal officers. Thus, Weeks supplied
"teeth" to the fourth amendment, making it a rule of evidence.
Shinyu Noro v. United States, 148 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720
(1945).
7 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 20 Abi. Jup. Evidence, § 393
(1939).
8 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939).
. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
10 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
"I United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
12 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18282 U.S. 383 (1914).
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The Weeks opinion went on to say, however, that this exclusionary
rule of evidence did not bind state officers in pursuit of their police
activities.
This limitation carried with it an attendant evil. Federal officers,
in order to obviate the requirement of procuring a search warrant,
would enlist the assistance of a state officer who would then procure
evidence in a wrongful or illegal fashion. Such evidence, under
the Weeks case interpretation, would be admissible in federal court
prosecutions. The employment of such unfair tactics led to the
evolution of the "participation doctrine." Where overt participation
between state and federal authorities was established, such evidence,
procured as a -result of an illegal search and seizure was excluded
in federal court prosecutions.14 The trend toward constitutional
protection was extended in Rea v. United States15 which held that
evidence illegally seized and suppressed in federal court could not
be turned over to state authorities for state prosecution on the
theory that federal courts had the right of exercise of authority over
their own officers.
In Wolf v. Colorado,6 the Supreme Court held that in a prosecu-
tion in a state court for a state crime, the fourth amendment pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers but that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not forbid
the admission of relevant evidence even though obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure. Thus, in Wolf the Supreme Court
decided that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed
upon the states which were free to admit or exclude such evidence.
Where state officers made a search and seizure not for the purpose
of aiding in prosecution of the federal offense, the results of said
seizure, however procured, could then be turned over to federal
authorities for prosecution in the federal courts.17 Where evidence
was improperly obtained by state officers and presented on a silver
platter to federal officials for use in a federal prosecution, some courts
held such evidence admissible and other courts held it inadmissible.'?
14 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949) (state activities participated in by
federal officer); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927) (state officers acting on
behalf of federal officers); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (joint participation
by state and federal officers).
350 U.S. 214 (1956).
'6 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27 United States v. Haywood, 208 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1953).
i2 Compare West v. United States, 259 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1958), and Graham v.
[Vol. 1963: 472
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The difference in federal interpretations concerning the silver platter
doctrine was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court of United
States in Elkins v. United States9 in which the Court, in overruling
Weeks, repudiated the silver platter doctrine where evidence legally
obtained by state officers without federal participation or cooperation
was held inadmissible in a federal court prosecution.
In the recent revolutionary decision of Mapp v. Ohio, which
amplified the Wolf rule that the fourteenth amendment incorpo-
rated the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court held that all
evidence obtained by search and seizure by state officials in violation
of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a criminal trial in the
state court. Thus, Mapp put "teeth" in the fourteenth amendment
by requiring extension of the federal exclusionary rule to the
states. The law is now well established that any and all evidence
procured by either state or federal officials20 as a result of an illegal
or unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the constitutional
rights of an accused is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a federal
or state court inasmuch as the federal exclusionary rule is now an
essential part of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments.2 '
II
ORIGINAL CIVIL TAx PROCEEDINGS
A. Enforcement of Section 7602 Summons--
Theory of Probable Cause
It has been seen that in a criminal proceeding the fourth amend-
ment affords protection against an actual search and seizure of an
individual's premises which has been found to be unreasonable.
On the other hand, the determination of the fourth amendment's
United States, 257 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1958), with Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (fourth amendment held applicable to state officers through fourteenth
amendment).
"364 U.S. 206 (1960).
20 Evidence procured by a non-governmental third-party still is admissible, Geniviva
v. Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (protection of fourth amendment applies
only against governmental agencies and their employees and not to the acts of private
individuals).
21 Evidence obtained in violation of an individual's rights under the fourth amend-
ment may be objected to at the trial, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921),
or, prior to the trial, the defendant may move for suppression of the illegally seized
evidence pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides a method for enforcing the protection against an unreasonable search and
seizure guaranteed by the fourth amendment. In re Bodkin, 165 F. Supp. 25 (E.D.N.Y.
1958); United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
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proper function in the requirement, through an administrative sum-
mons or subpoena of the production of one's books and records, a
figurative or constructive search, requires further examination.
More particularly, may a taxpayer or third party assert the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment during the course of a federal tax
investigation on the basis that an administrative summons or sub-
poena duces tecum issued him is oppressive, unreasonable, broad
and inquisitorial, and therefore in violation of his rights under the
fourth amendment?
The ability of the Internal Revenue Service to investigate is
essential to the proper determination, assessment and collection of
taxes. Congress has provided the Internal Revenue Service with
power and authority to require testimony and the production of
books and records for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of
the return or determining or collecting the tax liability.2 2 Section
7603 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for the issuance
of the summons23 and contains the requirement that the books and
papers must be described "with reasonable certainty." Sections 7604
and 7402 (b) of the Code empower the United States District Court24
for the district in which the person resides to enforce the subpoena
by requiring obedience to the summons under penalty of punish-
ment for contempt for refusal to do so. The only limitations written
into the statute are the provisions in section 7605 that the time and
place of examination must be "reasonable under the circumstances";
that the date for appearance before the agent shall be not less than
ten days from the date of the summons; and that no taxpayer shall
be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations, and only
one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be made for
each taxable year, unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or the
Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer
in writing that an additional inspection is necessary.
While the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code relating to
examination and inspection of returns are silent for the most part
as to the right of the taxpayer to refuse the agent's request for exam-
22 INT. RE v. CoDE oF 1954, § 7602.
21 Rev. Pro. 55-6, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 903, sets forth the procedure for use, issuance
and enforcement of summons in accordance with the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
2"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply on the hearing of the petition.
Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
[V9ol. 1963: 472
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ination of his papers, it is to be noted that these statutory provisions
are limited by the Constitution and in particular by the fourth and
fifth amendments.
An administrative summons has been held analogous to a grand
jury subpoena25 and equivalent to a search and seizure26 on the
theory that a compulsory production of one's private papers to
establish a criminal charge against him or to forfeit his property
is within the scope of the fourth amendment in all cases in which
a search and seizure would be. Thus, constitutionality requires that
a subpoena equivalent to a search and seizure must be a reasonable
exercise of the inquisitorial power.27
A federal tax investigation normally is controlled by the codal
provision which provides that the period of limitations within which
a statutory tax assessment may be made against a taxpayer is three
years after the return is filed; 28 however, in cases of an unlawful
attempt in any manner to defeat or evade tax, assessment and/or
collection may proceed at any time.29
Prior to an investigation of barred years, the government, under
certain circumstances, has been required to show a probability of
fraud. Such a requirement is generally referred to as a showing of
probable cause and the concept is called the probable cause theory.
The requirement of proof of probable cause necessary to open time-
barred years to investigation seemingly is based on the grounds either
that the examination is necessary as required by section 7605 (b) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or that otherwise the privilege
against unlawful search and seizure granted by the fourth amend-
ment would be violated.
Section 7605 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
provides that no taxpayer shall be subject to unnecessary examina-
2 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
20 Boyd v. United States, 166 U.S. 616 (1886) (compulsory production of individual's
business invoices to be used as evidence against him in quasi-criminal proceeding to
forfeit his property for alleged fraud against the federal custom laws, held adminis-
trative process was an unreasonable search and seizure).
27 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (subpoena duces tecum requiring production
of all books and papers of a corporation may be so onerous as to constitute an un-
reasonable search).
28 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (a).
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6501 (c) (1), (2). Thus, where the statute of limitations
for assessment of the tax has expired, the production of taxpayer's books and records
may not be ordered, Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. United States, 11 F.2d 348
(3d Cir. 1926), except where the statute is open because of a false or fraudulent return
or failure to file a return.
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tions, has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit as requiring a showing of probable cause before closed years
may be open to investigation.30 The First Circuit accordingly
ordered a taxpayer to comply with a subpoena duces tecum as regards
closed tax years where there was a showing of a reasonable belief of
fraud.31 Similarly, section 7605 (b) has been interpreted as requiring
a showing of probable cause by the Ninth Circuit in Martin v.
Chandis Securities Co. 32 and more recently in Boren v. Tucker.33
In a petition seeking enforcement of a summons relative to
barred years, however, the Second Circuit appears to have rejected
the probable cause theory on the ground that the examination is not
unnecessary or unreasonable within the meaning of section 7605 (b)
merely because the years under investigation are barred.34 This
view appears consistent with the position earlier taken by the Second
Circuit that an investigation is not "unnecessary" under section
7605 (b) even though facts are not alleged which indicate the prob-
able cause for the investigation. 35
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit appears to be of the
view that no showing of probable cause is required in that all that
is required is an allegation or showing of suspicion of fraud without
the ncessity of delving into the basis of that suspicion.3 6 Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit appears to have adopted the view that proof of
probable cause is not required in that the allegation of facts to
31 O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958) (subpoena dismissed where
failure to show that a reasonable basis existed for a suspicion of fraud or that there
was probable cause to believe that the taxpayer was guilty of fraud in a statute-barred
year).
0' Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904
(1960).
32 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
38239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956) (held, there was a sufficient showing of the possi-
bility of fraud to permit the inquiry into the matter and to require production of the
records sought).
"I Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
Or-United States v. Carroll, 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857
(1957) (government need not allege nor show grounds for questioning whether tax-
payer was resident of Germany prior to his being required to produce records for the
year involved); United States v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.
1946) (bona fide government suspicion of fraud required taxpayer to respond to 6ub-
poena duces tecum with respect to barred tax years).
OOEberhart v. Broadrock Dev. Corp., 296 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1961); Corbin Deposit
Bank v. United States, 244 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1957); Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954) (government
agent not obliged to disclose in detail the facts relative to fraud features of his investi-
gation).
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reasonably justify a suspicion of fraud is not required.37 The Third
Circuit appears to require an allegation of fraud or at least a
suspicion thereof to show that the investigation is necessary.38
It is seen that the federal circuit courts are in conflict over the
question of whether proof of probable cause is required by section
7605 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in the enforcement of
an administrative summons incident to a civil tax investigation.
Similarly, uncertainty reigns over the question whether proof of
probable cause is required by the fourth amendment.
Where a section 7602 summons was directed to the taxpayer, in-
vocation of the fourth amendment was permitted to protect his
books from a second examination where the tax year was barred and
no suspicion of fraud was shown.39 Application of the fourth amend-
ment appears to have rested on the practical consideration that where
a taxpayer has duly made his return and paid the tax, and the
statutory time limit for further assessment has expired, there should
be no further required examination unless there is prima facie
some good reason therefor. While the procedure sought, testimony
under oath with reference to books and records, was not literally a
search and seizure proscribed by the fourth amendment, the court in
Andrews and Brooklyn Pawnbrokers interpreted the fourth amend-
ment as imposing upon it a duty to protect the citizen against un-
reasonable and oppressive, inquisitorial investigations instituted and
conducted without probable cause.
The Second Circuit, however, does not interpret the fourth
amendment as requiring an advance showing that the underlying
tax liability is not time-barred. 0 In ordering a bank to comply
with an Internal Revenue Service summons to produce records of
the taxpayer with respect to barred years, the Second Circuit in
Foster observed that an examination is not unnecessary or unreason-
able within the meaning of the fourth amendment merely because
any period of time has elapsed since the tax return was filed. Since
the examination provided by section 7602 is to determine the
87 Globe Construction Co. v. Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956) (allegations
of fraud in agent's affidavit held sufficient).
""Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
39 In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937) (protective prin-
ciple of fourth amendment not limited to criminal proceedings but extended to civil
proceedings as well). See also In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 304
(E.D.N.Y. 1941) (taxpayer entitled to bc free from unreasonable harassment).
40 Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
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liability of any person for any internal revenue tax, the Second
Circuit would interpret the constitutional immunity from unreason-
able searches as not relieving a citizen of his testimonial duty to
disclose information needed for the just and proper discharge of the
governmental investigative functions.
It is submitted that the Foster interpretation of the role of the
fourth amendment as not requiring a showing of probable cause
represents a more meaningful and correct analysis of the problem
involved. In any event, and under no circumstances is the govern-
ment required to prove fraud.
Section 7602 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 enables
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to examine third parties and
authorizes him to require the production of books and papers
material to the taxpayer's returns. The majority of decisions here
involved third-party banking institutions which are subpoenaed
to produce records of deposits and withdrawals of the taxpayer. It
is settled that the taxpayer lacks standing to object to an enforcement
order issued against the bank as a search or seizure forbidden by the
fourth amendment since the taxpayer lacks a proprietary interest
in the records.41
The bank, on the other hand, has been permitted to resist a
subpoena duces tecum as constituting an unreasonable search where
the search is out of all proportion to the end sought.42  In other
cases, however, the bank must comply with a summons determined
to be reasonable in absence of a showing that the subpoena was
oppressive, unreasonable, or unnecessary.43 The rationale of these
cases appears to be that the fourth amendment, where applicable, at
most guards against abuse'only by way of too much indefiniteness
or breadth in the things required to be particularly described.44
41 Foster v. United States, supra note 40; People's Deposit Bank & Trust v. United
States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954); Zimmerman v. Wilson,
105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939); McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937) (customer held not entitled to prevent broker from complying with
subpoena issued by SEC to produce copy of customer's account); In re Upham's
Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
4First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1947) (subpoena re-
quiring bank to produce six million items for inspection and run them on recordak
machine held unreasonable); United States v. Third Northwestern Bank, 102 F. Supp.
879 (D. Minn. 1952) (summons required bank to examine 58,577 different items where
taxpayer may have had only one transaction).
43 People's Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838 (1954).
"See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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Thus, it is seen that the question is whether the description of the
records to be produced is so broad as to amount to an unreasonable
search and seizure. An attorney successfully raised the bar of the
fourth amendment in resisting a subpoena duces tecum which
required the production before a grand jury of all his books, records,
files, log books, memoranda, correspondence and other documents
for a term of ten years.45 An accountant's plea of unreasonableness
under the fourth amendment was held unfounded and a contempt
order affirmed where a subpoena duces tecum required that the
accountant provide the grand jury with the names of taxpayers
appearing on copies of twenty-five tax returns in his office.46
Reliance on the fourth amendment has not been limited to mat-
ters relative to the determination of the proper tax liability. The
bar of the fourth amendment has been raised, unsuccessfully, in
collection matters in Jarecki v. WhetstoneV wherein the government
brought suit to enforce an Internal Revenue subpoena duces tecum
issued to the taxpayer to appear with her books and records disclosing
her financial condition and to testify with respect to collection of her
1944 income tax liability. The court, however, noting that the
fourth amendment is to be applied to protect a citizen against an
oppressive, unreasonable and inquisitorial investigation, denied tax-
payer's motion to dismiss the subpoena duces tecum on the ground
that it violated the fourth amendment inasmuch as nothing was con-
tained in the terms of the summons which violated her constitutional
guarantees.
It can be seen from the foregoing that under certain narrow
circumstances an aggrieved party during the course of a federal tax
investigation may contest the enforcement of an Internal Revenue
Service subpoena on either codal grounds where the examination is
unnecessary within the meaningof section 7605 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 or upon constitutional grounds where the in-
vestigation is oppressive, unreasonable, inquisitorial and out of all
proportion to the end sought as violative of the searches and seizures
provisions of the fourth amendment. This right of an aggrieved
15 Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956).
46Donnelly v. United States, 201 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1953). See Broadrock Dev.
Corp. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 283 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1960), wherein a corporate
taxpayer's motion to quash a summons issued under § 7602 for production of its books
and records as being too broad and therefore in violation of the fourth amendment
was rejected as lacking in substance.
7 82 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. 111. 1948).
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party in a civil proceeding somewhat parallels the right of a de-
fendant to raise the applicability of the fourth amendment in a
criminal proceeding.
B. Validity of Civil Tax Assessment as Affected
by Fourth Amendment
It has been seen that the fourth amendment plays a limited role
in resisting an administrative subpoena incident to the determina-
tion of a civil tax liability and assessment. An interesting current
question in need of resolution is whether a taxpayer may contest an
existing civil tax assessment as illegal where the evidence upon which
the civil tax liability was determined has been suppressed in a related
criminal proceeding under the federal exclusionary rule as violative
of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
A number of judicial decisions have been cited for the proposition
that the federal exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment applies to
civil cases. In the early case of Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v.
United States,48 a writ of subpoena was rendered invalid because in
framing it the government used evidence earlier obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment. Therein, while the defendants were under
arrest on an indictment, officers of the United States without right or
authority seized defendant's books, papers, and documents. The
originals were ultimately ordered returned but a new indictment
was prepared against the defendants based upon the knowledge the
government agents had obtained in the original illegal search. A
subsequent government subpoena for the production of the original
records was issued and the lower court ordered defendants in con-
tempt for failure to honor the subpoena. On appeal, the contempt
order was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States on
the ground that the government could not use knowledge that it had
illegally gained by seizure of the origirtal papers "to call upon the
owners in a more regular form to produce them"; that, if it could,
it would be to "reduce the fourth amendment to a form of words";
and that the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court "but that it shall not be used at
48251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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all." The Court further noted that knowledge gained by the govern-
ment's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.
The Silverihorne case stands for the proposition that a writ of
subpoena prepared for use in a subsequent criminal action is invalid
because of the use in framing it of evidence ordered returned by
reason of an illegal search and seizure in an earlier criminal proceed-
ing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Rogers v. United
States,49 relying on Silverthorne, interpreted the Silverthorne phrase
"but that it shall not be used at all" to render invalid a civil judg-
ment in the procurement of which evidence illegally obtained was
used. Therein the government instituted a civil action in assumpsit
to recover certain duties on foreign imported liquors imposed under
the Tariff Act and recovered judgment against defendant. On
appeal, the defendant's first assignment of error related to admission
in evidence of certain liquors imported by Rogers which the govern-
ment seized as the result of an unlawful search. Rogers made appli-
cation to the district court for an order directing that the liquor
be returned for the reason that it was seized illegally. The district
court held the search warrant illegal and ordered the property
seized returned, which was done. In the government's subsequent
civil suit -in assumpsit for the custom duties, the government was
allowed, over objection, to introduce evidence much of which had
been illegally obtained. The district court ruled that the evidence
was admissible, that this was a suit of a "civil nature . . .and that
such evidence is admissible in a civil suit," though not in a crim-
inal one, and the defendant excepted. Relying on Silverthorne, the
First Circuit reversed and rendered invalid the civil judgment as
based on evidence illegally seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment.
The case of Tovar v. Jarecki0 is also in point. Therein, the
taxpayer instituted suit to enjoin and restrain the collection from
him of a special marijuana tax assessed at the rate of $100.00 per
ounce under section 2590 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, claiming the tax assessment was illegal because the evidence
acquired by illegal search and seizure upon which the tax was based
had been suppressed in a related criminal case in which he was
named defendant. In the injunction suit, the court observed that
"97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
88 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. I1. 1948).
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if the assessment had been based solely upon evidence obtained by
the government by the unlawful search and seizure, and which evi-
dence was before the court in the related criminal case, it would be
required to hold the tax illegal and grant the relief prayed. The
plaintiff, however, did not prevail inasmuch as he failed to prove
that the officer who made the assessment acted upon evidence which
had previously been ordered suppressed.
The principle of law that evidence obtained by the government
in violation of a person's rights secured by the fourth amendment is
not admissible against him in a criminal proceeding has been ex-
tended to other types of civil cases as well.5'
In view of the foregoing, it would seem that the fourth amend-
ment could be utilized to permit a taxpayer to contest an existing
civil tax assessment under the narrow circumstances where (1) a
court in the related criminal proceeding has quashed the search
warrant and suppressed the evidence seized at the raid and ordered it
returned; (2) the indictment based on such evidence has been dis-
missed; (3) the government's libel of information has been dis-
missed and all property seized ordered returned; and (4) there exist
no records or other evidence other than those illegally seized and
ordered returned from which the government could make a civil
tax determination. 52
III
COLLATERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
A. Forfeiture Proceedings as Affected by Fourth Amendment
In cases where evidence is suppressed in the criminal proceeding
because of an illegal search and seizure, should the money or property
be returned to the accused because the arrest, search and seizure is
illegal? Pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the accused may move for the return of the property illegally
"' United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949) (evidence suppressed because
of illegal search held not admissible in civil forfeiture suit). See also Bolger v. Cleary,
293 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion); Schenck v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776
(D. Mass. 1938) (deportation proceeding); Ex parte Jackson, 263 Fed. 110 (D. Mont.
1920) (evidence based upon illegal search and seizure held not admissible in civil
deportation proceedings).
82 Compare Reineman v. United States, 301 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1962), wherein a civil
tax assessment was ruled invalid where based on a second inspection of taxpayer's books
of account made without giving taxpayer prior written notice as required by § 7602 (b)
of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954.
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seized. The mere fact, however, that property is illegally seized
from the possession of the aggrieved person does not necessarily
require its return inasmuch as the fourth amendment does not
irrevocably guarantee that illegally seized property will be returned
to its owner.5 3 This rule applies particularly to contraband property
or property forfeitable or subject to lien or libel.54
Following commencement of an information against him for
violation of the federal excise-wagering tax laws, taxpayer's motion
pursuant to Federal Criminal Rule 41 (e) to suppress evidence (cash,
automobile) was granted, but taxpayer's subsequent action to recover
evidence illegally seized pursuant to fourth amendment was dis-
missed in Field v. United States"5 and Carlo v. United States.58 In
United States v. Macri57 an illegal search and seizure by a federal
officer resulted in suppression of evidence, money and paraphernalia,
pursuant to a pre-trial motion to suppress relating to violation of the
federal excise-wagering tax laws, but the court refused to return the
property pending a civil forfeiture or libel action pursuant to section
7302 of the Internal Revenue Code.
It is apparent from the foregoing decisions that the fourth amend-
ment does not assure a return of the property subject to forfeiture.
B. Forfeiture Proceedings as Affected by Acquittal
Practically every state in the Union has enacted legislation author-
izing courts and prosecution officials to confiscate contraband articles,
i.e., gambling paraphernalia, narcotics and illicit liquors. The fed-
eral government likewise has caused similar laws to be enacted.58
Where governmental or state agencies seek to forfeit property or
contraband articles, which may have been the subject of criminal
charges against a defendant wherein the defendant was acquitted,
11 Welsh v. United States, 220 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (money illegally seized in
lottery raid and suppressed as evidence held subject to federal tax lien).
" United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948) (contraband distilling equipment illegally seized in violation of Internal
Revenue laws properly suppressed as evidence in criminal proceeding but owner not
entitled to its return inasmuch as it was contraband); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) (alcohol).
15 263 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959) (illegally seized evidence
held subject to federal tax liens and levy).
" 286 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961) (money received in
search not ordered returned where tax lien had been asserted).
'7 185 F. Supp. 144 (D. Conn. 1960).
"9 See §§ 7301-44, INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954; 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (1958).
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what effect does the acquittal of the accused have upon such "for-
feiture proceeding?
It was early held in Coffey v. United States that where the same
acts that are relied upon to justify the forfeiture have already been
determined and adjudicated in the criminal prosecution, the acquittal
of the defendant operates as a bar to the forfeiture proceeding5 9
The Coffey decision was followed recently in United States v. One
1956 Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan.60
The observation has been made, however, that the" statutory
provisions defining a criminal offense and the statutory provisions
providing for a forfeiture and confiscation of contraband articles are
separate and apart and should be determined in independent causes
of action.61 The reasoning behind this view is that the degree of
proof required in each instance is different. Thus, not every
acquittal in a criminal case will operate as a bar to forfeiture pro-
ceedings, because the facts and circumstances in each case differ
inasmuch as the parties may not be the same, or the degree of proof
may be different. In the landmark case of Helvering v. Mitchell, 2
the accused was criminally charged for willful tax evasion in viola-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code and acquitted, and the govern-
ment then sought to impose a civil tax fraud penalty upon the
accused who defended on the ground that he had been acquitted of
criminal charges touching on the same subject matter. The Supreme
Court of the United States rejected this contention maintaining that
the accused could have been acquitted because of the degree of proof
that the government was required to adduce in order to obtain con-
viction; whereas, on the civil side of the case, a lesser degree of proof
could well establish the fact that the accused was amenable to a civil
tax penalty. The Supreme Court in Mitchell distinguished Coffey
which was held not to apply to a situation where there had been an
acquittal upon a criminal case followed by a civil action requiring
a different degree of proof.
While mere acquittal in the criminal action is not an adjudica-
80 Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) (forfeiture of spirits and distilling
equipment barred by acquittal on charge of removing and concealing distilled spirits
with the intent to defraud the revenue).
0o 272 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1959) (held acquittal in criminal case barred Government
recovery in subsequent forfeiture suit for automobile where based on same set of facts).
G' United States v. Harvin, 91 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1950) (conviction or acquittal
of criminal offense of possessing liquor intended for use in violating Internal Revenue
laws does not bar forfeiture).
6'303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Vol. 1963: 472] FOURTH AMENDMENT IN CIVIL CASES 487
tion upon which the owner can rely in the forfeiture action,3 evi-
dence suppressed because of the illegal search has been ruled in-
admissible in the civil forfeiture prodeeding. 4 The forfeiture
action, moreover, is insufficient if, absent the suppressed evidence,
the record lacks in evidence to support the forfeiture. 65
A review of the foregoing indicates that the better view is that
acquittal of the criminal charge does not bear on the civil forfeiture
proceeding; that illegally obtained evidence suppressed in the
criminal case appears not admissible in the civil forfeiture case; and
that the fourth amendment does not insure the return of contraband
or property forfeitable or subject to lien or libel.
IV
CONCLUSION
It is seen that the role played by the fourth amendment has
undergone radical expansion in the criminal area of the law and
that the fourth amendment plays a definite role in certain civil
proceedings. The ability of the Internal Revenue Service to investi-
gate is essential to the proper determination, assessment and col-
lection of taxes and an investigative civil summons has been likened
unto a grand jury subpoena and equivalent to a search and seizure.
Prior to an investigation of barred years, the government generally
has been required to show a probability of fraud or at least a
suspicion of fraud on either section 7605 (b) codal grounds or consti-
tutional grounds under the fourth amendment. Under certain
narrow circumstances, the fourth amendment apparently may also
be utilized to render invalid a civil tax assessment. The fourth
amendment does not guarantee a return of forfeited property and
the forfeiture proceedings seem not to be affected by an acquittal.
It may reasonably be anticipated that the fourth amendment's role
in civil cases will undergo further expansion in the future.66
03 United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949); United States v. One 1953
Oldsmobile Sedan, 132 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ark. 1955); United States v. 38 Cases, 99
F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477 (1943).
61 United States v. Physic, supra note 63; United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile
Sedan, supra note 63.
Ir United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1949).
61 Note the recent decision in Peters v. Rosetti (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), 31 U.S.L. WEEK
2396 (Feb. 1, 1963), wherein the court, relying on Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
ruled that evidence obtained by police officers from an apartment during an illegal
search was inadmissable in a civil suit where the tenant of the apartment sought to
recover money taken from him in the search.
